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INTRODUCTION
In August 2018, the American public became privy to the President’s
use of an extensive system of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) and
nondisparagement clauses to prevent campaign staff and White House
employees from betraying his confidence, leaking information to the press, or
besmirching––in any way––his administration or family.1 These contracts for
silence2 were particularly restrictive, even for a man with a fondness for
management-friendly employment agreements3 and a penchant for “information
1
For a representative NDA with the Trump campaign, see Read: 2016 Trump Campaign
Nondisclosure Agreement, CNN (Aug. 14, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/
14/politics/trump-campaign-nda-omarosa/index.html [https://perma.cc/K2XL-8JGB]. For a
representative NDA with a White House official, see Ruth Marcus, Trump Had Senior Staff
Sign Nondisclosure Agreements. They’re Supposed to Last Beyond His Presidency, WASH. POST
(Mar. 18, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-nondisclosureagreements-came-with-him-to-the-white-house/2018/03/18/226f4522-29ee-11e8b79df3d931db7f68_story.html?utm_term=.7c03cf0d8ee4 [https://perma.cc/4KKH-W5QH].
2
Here, I depart from the “contracts of silence” phrasing used most prominently by Arthur
Garfield in his landmark article on secrecy in contract law. See Arthur Garfield, Promises of
Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 268 n.17 (1997).
I do so to underscore the purpose of these agreements––to chill or outright silence speech––
and to achieve that end through restrictive, sometimes absurdly large penalties. This
Comment is also distinguishable in that I devote more time to grappling with, and potentially
resolving, First Amendment arguments against enforcing contracts for silence. Nevertheless,
I cite to Garfield’s work throughout this Comment as a precursor to my analysis.
3
News accounts chronicling President Trump’s extensive use of NDAs and other contracts
for silence are legion. See, e.g., David A. Graham, Donald Trump’s Long History of Paying
for Silence, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2018/01/donald-trumps-long-history-with-hush-money/550745/ [https://perma.cc/4WDK73ZN] (“At various times in the past, Donald Trump has struck deals with women in his life,
or formerly in his life, exchanging money for silence.”). This includes former employees.
See, e.g., Julianna Goldman & Laura Strickler, Trump Organization Employees Must Agree
to Keep Info About Trump Family Secret, CBS EVENING NEWS (July 27, 2017, 7:20 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-organization-new-confidentiality-agreement-employees
-family-secret/ [https://perma.cc/W9LB-P7E2] (describing the widespread use of NDAs
within the Trump Organization, President Trump’s family company). He has also used
contracts for silence to control media exposure surrounding past marriages. See, e.g., Trump
v. Trump, 582 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1008–09 (App. Div. 1992) (enforcing a nondisclosure
agreement against now-President Trump’s first wife, Ivana). Importantly for my purposes,
this penchant for NDAs led President Trump to require presidential campaign and transition
period staffers—in addition to current White House employees—to sign contracts for
silence. See Scott Horsley, Sworn to Secrecy: Trump’s History of Using Nondisclosure
Agreements, NPR (Mar. 19, 2018, 6:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/19/595025070/
sworn-to-secrecy-trumps-history-of-using-nondisclosure-agreements [https://perma.cc/CV
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mischief.”4 For instance, not only did his campaign NDA apply to any piece
of information then-candidate Trump deemed covered, it also stated that
campaign employees’ obligation existed in perpetuity.5 A draft of the
NDA he imposed on White House staff, meanwhile, stipulated a $10
million penalty for each breach.6
Of course, wrongdoers have long used contractual spurs to silence
their accusers in a variety of contexts––from industrial accidents in the
1990s7 to clergy sex abuse scandals;8 from the #MeToo movement9 to
Silicon Valley titans with their armies of independent contractors.10 Only
recently, however, have pundits, legal scholars, and activists alike begun
considering the legality of these contracts for silence in the context of state
actors––and most notably those involving the 45th President of the United
States.11
N8-D58B]. In sum, “President Trump seems . . . to have raised contractually enforced silence
to an art form.” Burt Neuborne, Limiting the Right to Buy Silence; A Hearer-Centered
Approach, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 411, 425 (2019).
4
As Nathan Cortez describes in a recent article,
[T]he Trump administration has adopted a variety of mischievous
information policies . . . . many unrelated to each other, that together signal
a shift away from open government . . . towards more cynical uses of
government information. Examples include removing certain data from the
public domain, manipulating data, censoring scientists at various federal
departments, scrubbing certain terms and topics from federal web sites,
and using transparency initiatives as a pretext to undermine sound science.
Nathan Cortez, Information Mischief Under the Trump Administration, 94 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 315, 315–16 (2019).
5
Read: 2016 Trump Campaign Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 1.
6
Id.; Marcus, supra note 1.
7
Barry Siegel, Dilemmas of Settling in Secret: Companies Offer Hefty Sums in Exchange for
Keeping the Details of Public-Hazard Lawsuits Quiet. Plaintiffs Must Choose Their Own
Interest or the Public Good, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/199104-05/news/mn-1990_1_public-interest [https://perma.cc/FA8D-2LD5].
8
Adam Liptak, Price of Broken Vows of Silence, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/26/us/price-of-broken-vows-of-silence.html [https://
perma.cc/P5FY-8RTH].
9
Matthews Garrahan, Harvey Weinstein: How Lawyers Kept a Lid on Sexual Harassment
Claims, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1dc8a8ae-b7e0-11e7-8c125661783e5589 [https://perma.cc/BCE6-5A2B].
10
Katie Benner, Abuses Hide in the Silence of Nondisparagement Agreements, N.Y. TIMES
(July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/technology/silicon-valley-sexualharassment-non-disparagement-agreements.html [https://perma.cc/9T42-G65Y].
11
This is as good a time as ever to disclaim that this Comment only contemplates contracts
for silence entered into by federal officials, not state or local government actors. I will not
devote any time to exploring the use of similar agreements by cities and municipalities in
settlements they reach with private citizens. Whether and how these officials ought to be able
to chill citizen speech is a topic for a different paper.
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Historically, courts have been extremely deferential to government
entities that restrict employees’ speech when the integrity of sensitive data
is at stake.12 Debate is therefore liveliest around whether and when
government actors can quell public employees’ disclosures of
nonclassified information learned on the job.13
But the question of how to treat government contracts for silence
extends far beyond the Beltway’s bipartisan cottage industry of political
“tell-alls”.14 For instance, contracts for silence potentially implicate
questions of federal labor law and may be in tension with federal statutes
put in place to protect government whistleblowers. Moreover, contracts for
silence are fraught with political accountability concerns. Imagine, for
example, the uniquely corrosive effect of an elected official enforcing a
contract for silence against a former employee and current constituent.
To be sure, many share a common-sense intuition that the government
should not be able to unduly infringe upon individual citizens’ abilities to engage

12

See, e.g., Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfunkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989) (allowing the
government to protect classified information through contractual relationships with federal
employees privy to sensitive information). Courts have also held that the government cannot
restrict former employees from disclosing unclassified information in written form (i.e.
in “tell-all” memoirs). McGhee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United
States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972).
13
See, e.g., Esha Bhandari, No, the President Can’t Legally Gag White House Staffers,
ACLU (Mar. 20, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/employee-speechand-whistleblowers/no-president-cant-legally-gag-white-house [https://perma.cc/VT264WER] (discussing how the Trump Administration’s broad use of nondisclosure agreements
should be held unenforceable because “the First Amendment protects federal employees’
right to speak in a private capacity about matters of public concern––and certainly the
functioning of a presidential administration raises many issues that are of public concern”).
14
See Douglas Martin, W. Marvin Watson, Johnson’s Unofficial Chief of Staff, Dies at 93,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/obituaries/w-marvinwatson-johnsons-unofficial-chief-of-staff-dies-at-93.html [https://perma.cc/ZDM5-4CBD]
(contextualizing Watson’s memoir on the Johnson Administration); see also Concepción De
León, Is Everyone in Politics Writing a Tell-All? Yes, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/books/review/political-books-announced.html
[https://perma.cc/WST2-UMND] (providing an overview of then-forthcoming political
memoirs recounting life in the Obama Administration and during the 2016 presidential
election campaign); David Klinghoffer, A Speechifier in Her Own Write: What I Saw at the
Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era by Peggy Noonan, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 1990),
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-02-04/books/bk-87_1_peggy-noonan [https://perma.cc/Y3CDD5ZY] (discussing the memoir of a controversial Reagan-era speechwriter); Morton
Knodracke, How to Lose Friends and Influence, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 1988),
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/29/books/how-to-lose-friends-and-influence.html
[https://perma.cc/5JFC-DDBT] (reviewing a fiery memoir penned by President Reagan’s
former chief of staff).
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in public debate.15 An editor at The Washington Post has gone so far as to deem
the current administration’s runaway use of contracts for silence “constitutionally
repugnant.”16 But, as far as I can tell, none of these hit pieces have carefully
catalogued the legal arguments available to two categories of potential
plaintiffs: (1) current or former Trump Administration officials facing
lawsuits for sharing nonclassified information in violation of their NDAs; as
well as (2) former private sector or campaign staff of then-candidate Trump
who face lawsuits from the President for allegedly violating contracts for
silence they entered into before he became Chief Executive.
This Comment takes up this challenge. Rather than articulating and
defending a singular argument against the use of contracts for silence by
state actors, it suggests a menu of approaches––ranging from the
conventional to the more creative––for challenging these agreements.
Taking my cue from the pleadings of former executive branch and campaign
staffers challenging Trump’s NDAs and nondisparagement clauses, this
Comment explores both contract law and First Amendment grounds for
dismantling contracts for silence by state actors.17
In Part I, I describe the fundamental changes to contract law and the
practice of contracting which provide the backdrop for my discussions of
contracts for silence. In Part II, I provide the contract law argument for
invalidating contracts for silence by state actors, and in Part III, I provide its
foil: the First Amendment argument for declaring such agreements
unenforceable. I end each Part by contextualizing contracts for silence
within broader discussions around the value of transparency, public
access, and the importance of democratic self-governance.
Of course, both forks of this analysis deserve more extensive
treatment; this Comment seeks only to make future efforts more effective and
complete by outlining at least some of the potential paths forward. My hope
is that, in doing so, I provide scaffolding for the arguments of future
15

Alison Frankel, Trump NDAs Can’t Silence Ex-White House Officials: Legal Experts,
REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2018, 5:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-nda/trump-ndascant-silence-ex-white-house-officials-legal-experts-idUSKBN1GV2UT [https://perma.cc/
4S55-2WPJ]; Jessica Levinson, Can Trump Use NDAs to Prevent White House Staffers
Like Omarosa from Criticizing Him?, NBC (Aug. 14, 2018, 4:49 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/can-trump-use-ndas-stop-white-house-staffers-oma
rosa-criticizing-ncna900706 [https://perma.cc/343A-FAVC]; Bradley P. Moss, Why the White
House Can’t Stop Omarosa Manigault-Newman from Talking, LAWFARE (Aug. 14, 2018, 12:19
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-white-house-cant-stop-omarosa-manigault-newmantalking [https://perma.cc/DHC3-73A2].
16
Marcus, supra note 1.
17
See, e.g., Complaint at 3–5, Sims v. Trump, No. 1:19-cv-00345 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2019)
(advancing First Amendment arguments against the enforcement of an NDA against former
Trump communications adviser Cliff Sims).
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advocates who share in the belief that “the censorial power is in the people
over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.”18
I. CONTRACTS FOR SILENCE IN CONTEXT
The nature of contract law is changing. More and more contracts19
take the form of standard-form, boilerplate agreements which no one reads
and which no one sues upon.20 Plus, contracting seldom takes the form of
boisterous, extensive negotiations; more often than not, the employment and
consumer agreements most people interact with on a daily basis are not
bargained for.21 This raises concerns for those of us interested in what contract
law has to say about the enforceability of contracts for silence. To understand
the stakes of this discussion, I will first explain several contract law topics which
bear on the issue I have identified, and which set the stage for both the contract
law and First Amendment arguments against state-actor enforcement of
contracts for silence against individuals: (1) the privatization of litigation; (2) the
explosion of arbitration as a form of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR)
in recent years; and (3) the ongoing battle to protect whistleblowers as
potentially in tension with the underlying purpose of contracts for silence.
First, “litigation” is increasingly a private affair––conducted in
conference rooms before arbiters or rendered unnecessary by parties
motivated to settle early, which explains why, “even as filings have
increased, the percentages of cases going to trial (and the absolute number
18

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794)).
For the purposes of this Comment, I refer to settlements as falling under the larger umbrella
of contracts since “American law treats the settlement agreement as a member of the larger
family of private contracts.” Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the
Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 9 (1996); see also Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General
Theory of Waiver, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 478, 513 (1981) (“Settlements, even when reached
during a trial, are regarded as private contracts and interpreted according to contract rules.”).
20
See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard
Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 120 (2017) (questioning the value of boilerplate language
in a world where almost “no one reads their form contracts”).
21
See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2014) (charting the rise of standard-form contracts
containing boilerplate language and explaining the ways boilerplate contracts disempower
individual consumers or signatories and potentially undermine democratic norms). What’s
more, standard form agreements have become normalized not only in conventional consumer
agreements but even in business dealings among substantially more sophisticated parties.
See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2006)
(“Notwithstanding their representation by able counsel, charged to craft comprehensive and
detailed, but also particularized, contacts, such parties will commonly conclude agreements
comprised heavily of traditional terms––contracting norms of a sort––rather than terms
tailored to the distinct features of their particular bargain.”).
19
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of trials) have declined.”22 That the public is less able or unable to monitor
these proceedings or to read about their resolution ex post poses potential
harms to our democratic order (e.g. “how can justice in secret ever be
just?”).23 And while the trend towards more ADR and fewer public trials
shows no sign of abating, policymakers and judges do have the tools to
intervene and mitigate transparency concerns.24 Some would have them
pick up those tools and act quickly to defend the preeminence of public
trials and oppose the normalization of pretrial settlements as violative of
our democratic norms of publicity and public access.25
Second, the ubiquity of mandatory arbitration clauses has similarly
prevented evidence of disputes from becoming public, even after
resolution.26 These clauses require that parties to a contract bring any
claims to private arbitrators rather than in open court; they also sometimes
include prohibitions on class action suits.27 Researchers “estimat[e] that
22

Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 773–74 (2008).
See id. at 804 (“Open court proceedings enable people to watch, debate, develop, contest,
and materialize the exercise of both public and private power.”).
24
As Resnik explains,
[E]ven as judges and other dispute resolution providers move away from
trials and focus on pretrial management and dispute resolution in chambers
and conference rooms, it is possible to build in a place for the public
(‘sunshine,’ to borrow the term legislators have used) or to wall off
proceedings from the public.
Id. at 809.
25
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (“I do not believe that
settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judgement or should be institutionalized on a
wholesale and indiscriminate basis . . . . Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the
conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised.”). A decade after
Fiss’s landmark––and controversial––piece, David Luban revisited Against Settlement but left
intact much of its underlying foundation. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the
Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2620 (1995) (arguing that instead of being “for or against
settlement,” judges should only approve settlements when doing so serves judicial efficiency
as well as societal interests in “openness, legal justice, and the creation of public goods”); cf.
Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and the Public Access to the Courts, 105
HARV. L. REV. 428, 431 (1991) (“If public access assumes an importance on a par with the
[judicial] system’s concern for resolving disputes among the litigants, the traditional balance
would be upset and the courts diverted from their primary mission.”).
26
See generally Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015) (explaining the
impacts of this privatization––ranging from the slower pace at which judges are now producing
law to the power citizens are collectively ceding to arbitration groups at the expense of courts).
27
For a general overview of mandatory arbitration clauses, which The New York Times has
described as part “of a far-reaching power play orchestrated by American corporations,” see
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Beware the Fine Print: Part I: Arbitration
23
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roughly 20% of the non-unionized American workforce is covered by
mandatory arbitration provisions, and this number may well increase.”28
Plus, many major service providers also require their customers to consent
to mandatory arbitration provisions as a condition of their consumer
agreements.29 By severely restricting the ways consumers and workers seek
judicial relief for wrongs they have suffered, the movement towards
mandatory arbitration clauses is increasingly “disarm[ing]” individuals
seeking justice30 and providing procedural leverage to large, sophisticated
corporate parties.31 The Supreme Court has proven an engaged partner in
this movement, too––taking every opportunity to expand the prevalence of
mandatory arbitration clauses and rejecting, several times, the argument
that mandatory arbitration conceals important information from public
view.32
Third, policymakers are only just beginning to grapple with the
implications of these foundational changes to contract law––as well as the
growing frequency of NDAs and nondisparagement clauses––on
whistleblower statutes. Historically, these laws have protected employees
who come forward to regulators and elected officials to report
wrongdoing, either in corporate America or within the federal
government.33 In response to the ubiquity of NDAs, nondisparagement
Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes
.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html
[https://perma.cc/RC3G-9QTS].
28
Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory
Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1303, 1310 (2015).
29
These industries include credit cards, cell phone providers, cable and internet providers,
and banks––among others. PUBLIC CITIZEN, FORCED ARBITRATION: UNFAIR AND
EVERYWHERE 1 (2009), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/unfairandeverywhere.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8NLF-5TVB].
30
Sternlight, supra note 28, at 1310.
31
After all, more often than not control over procedure is as important––if not more
important—than control over substance. See, e.g., id. at 1309 (“I’ll let you write the substance
. . . you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw you every time” (citing Regulatory Reform
Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Regulations
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell))).
32
See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (upholding an arbitration
clause preventing an employee class-action despite the clause’s apparent tension with employees’
rights to “concerted activity” under the NLRA); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S.
228, 235 (2013) (holding that an arbitration clause would not be rendered unenforceable merely
because the cost of pursuing arbitration exceeded the amount available in recovery).
33
See, e.g., The Whistleblower Protection Program, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.whistleblowers.gov/ [https://perma.cc/6LVZ-AFZ4] (last visited Mar. 12,
2020) (providing resources to employees on their rights under federal whistleblower statutes
as well as a brief overview of whistleblower protections).
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provisions, and other contracts for silence, Congress saw fit in 2012 to
pass the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA), which
prohibits agencies from enforcing “any nondisclosure policy, form, or
agreement” that did not specifically include a savings clause ensuring
continuity of whistleblower protections. In theory, the WPEA was a win
for whistleblower advocates on the Hill.34 It reinforced federal
whistleblower protections in an age of speech-restrictive, standard-form
contracts and signaled to the rank-and-file of the federal workforce that
their right to come forward with evidence of fraud and abuse remained
protected. We have reason to worry about compliance with the WPEA,
though. Inspectors General within the Trump Administration, including at
both the Department of Homeland Security and General Services
Administration, have identified instances of agency shortcomings under
the WPEA.35 Plus, not all information that the public might have an
interest in hearing would be covered under even the most stringent
whistleblower law. While the exact consequences of these shifts in the
nature of contract law have yet to be seen, the changes to the very nature
34

A perhaps unexpected ally of federal whistleblowers on the Hill––and co-author of the
WPEA––has been Senator Chuck Grassley, former Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. See Ben Kostyack, Senator Grassley Reminds FBI Agents of Their
Whistleblower Rights, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND (May 25, 2018),
https://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2018/05/articles/government-whistleblowers/senatorgrassley-reminds-fbi-agents-of-their-whistleblower-rights/ [https://perma.cc/NZQ4-PECL].
In a 2018 speech delivered on National Whistleblower Appreciation Day, Senator Grassley
extolled the virtues of whistleblowers––reminding his audience of the time-honored tradition
of whistleblower protections dating back to the American Revolution and emphasizing that
whistleblowers consistently prevent fraud more effectively than relying solely on the
government to self-regulate. See Senator Chuck Grassley, Speech on National Whistleblower
Appreciation Day (July 30, 2018), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/
grassley-whistleblowers-deserve-our-profound-gratitude [https://perma.cc/T7BC-GLDT].
Apart from Senator Grassley, congressional action in defense of whistleblowers has been
limited to a stalled legislative proposal offering protection to federal whistleblowers who
come forward in spite of NDAs. No Disrupting Accountability (NDA) Act, H.R. 1484,
116th Cong. (2019). The late Rep. Elijah Cummings also issued a threat to withhold pay
from “White House officials who enforce nondisclosure agreements that lack protections
for federal whistleblowers.” Cristina Marcos, Cummings Threatens Salaries of Trump
Officials Who Enforce Nondisclosure Agreements, HILL (May 14, 2019, 12:59 PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/443616-cummings-threatens-salaries-of-trumpofficials-who-enforce-nondisclosure [https://perma.cc/9LS5-DXAK].
35
See Joe Davidson, Trump Likes Nondisclosure Agreements, but Should Federal Agencies
Use Secrecy Pacts?, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2018/08/21/trump-likes-nondisclosure-agreements-should-federal-agencies-usesecrecy-pacts/?utm_term=.3f433d5e4d51 [https://perma.cc/TV3N-LFL7] (describing the
failure of the DHS to include a required statement in all NDAs regarding the employee’s
rights and obligations concerning certain disclosures).
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of our legal agreements (including their forums and formats) are
important. While the following Parts touch on the topics raised here, they
do not propose resolutions to these ongoing debates; instead, they focus
on potential paths through the uncertain thicket that is the future of
contract law.
II. THE CONTRACT LAW ARGUMENT
Invalidating contracts for silence necessarily undermines the timehonored tradition of respecting contracting parties’ wishes, opening up a
variety of doctrinal unknowns.36 Indeed, freedom of contract is a foundational,
though not unquestioned, element of American law.37 To be sure, courts have
had no problem overriding parties’ wishes when substantial societal interests
are at risk. For example, contracts for silence which suppress evidence38 or
conceal crimes39 are routinely invalidated. Courts have also struck down
particularly restrictive contracts for silence when they violate the terms of
statutes40 or where courts have expressed and consistently applied public
policies against particular contractual practices.41 At the most basic level,
36

See M.P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 293 (1966)
(“One of the most interesting unresolved points is the extent to which one can sell one’s silence.”).
37
Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 610-11 (1936) (“[F]reedom of contract is the
general rule and restraint the exception.”); cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 392–93 (1937) (holding that freedom of contract is not an absolute right and may
be restricted when in the public interest).
38
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 554 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). The First Restatement
takes a harder line than the Second Restatement, which turned away from articulating specific
grounds for unenforceability and established a balancing test for finding contracts potentially
unenforceable on public policy grounds. Compare id. (“A bargain that has for its object or
consideration the suppression of evidence by inducing witnesses to leave the State, by the
destruction of documents, or otherwise, is illegal.”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (laying out factors which weigh in favor and against
enforcement of a contract term).
39
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 39, §548; see also Garfield, supra note
2, at 306–12 (explaining the application of the Second Restatement’s balancing test in the
context of contracts to conceal crimes).
40
See, e.g., Hobson Bearing Int’l, 365 N.L.R.B. 73 (2017) (invalidating relevant portions of
a confidentiality agreement that violated the National Labor Relations Act’s protections for
workers, including by “prohibiting employees from discussing their pay and/or bonuses” and
subjecting them to liquidated damages provisions if they breached).
41
For example, “the Eleventh Circui[t] [has a] long-standing approach that settlements in
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) litigation should not involve confidentiality because it
contravenes congressional intent behind the law and undermines regulatory efforts and that
FLSA settlement agreements must be filed in the court’s public docket.” Ronald L. Burdge,
Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements is Bad for Clients, Bad for Lawyers, Bad for
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“[t]he fact that people can use contracts [for] silence to keep important
information from reaching the public explains why lawmakers should want to
regulate these contracts.”42 But the fact remains that, more often than not,
courts are reluctant to disturb a bargained-for agreement. Therefore, it is critical
to begin this Part by acknowledging that invalidating contracts for silence
involves swimming upstream. Nevertheless, in this Part, I identify and evaluate
the strongest contract law arguments against contracts for silence, focusing
primarily on how to best assert public policy defenses to enforcement.
Parties agree to contracts for silence in a variety of contexts.
Sometimes, parties are motivated to enter into contracts for silence by
economic interests43––including worries that, should a particular piece of
information become public, another party to the agreement would suffer
financial consequences.44 Parties also contract for silence in the context of
settlement agreements designed to insulate a tortfeasor from civil liability
by “hushing” the party who could stand to gain by making that information
public.45 Both varieties of contracts for silence46 have generally been
Justice, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012privacyandconfidentiality/conf
identiality_settlement_agreements_is_bad_clients_lawyers_justice/ [https://perma.cc/483BMGR4] (citations omitted). Other courts have also invalidated confidentiality provisions in
court-reviewed FLSA settlements as contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Lopez v. Nights of
Cabiria, LLC, 96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (invalidating confidentiality provisions
of an employment agreement as “in strong tension with the remedial purposes of the FLSA”).
42
Garfield, supra note 2, at 275.
43
See id. at 266 (“[C]ontracts [for] silence have also long been used in commercial circles to
protect companies from the disclosure of valuable economic information such as trade secrets.”).
44
Id. at 269. While this example invites readers to think about corporate and individual tort
victims, contracts for silence are also de rigeur in the context of trade secret protection. For more,
see ARTHUR H. SEIDEL & DAVID R. CRICHTON, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD
KNOW ABOUT TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS 12 (3d ed. 1995) (“A trade secret
is misappropriated only when there is a wrongful taking, use, or disclosure of another’s trade secret.
Generally, a wrongful taking, use, or disclosure arises from a breach of a confidential or fiduciary
relationship or a violation of the norms of business conduct through theft or espionage.”).
45
See, e.g., Luban, supra note 25, at 2650 (“Among the products whose defects are alleged to
have been hidden by protective orders or sealed settlements are Dow Corning’s silicone gel breast
implants; pickup trucks made by Ford and General Motors; Upjohn’s sleeping pill Halcion;
Pfizer’s Bjork-Shiley heart valves; and McNeil Pharmaceutical’s painkiller, Zomax.”).
46
The examples contained in this paragraph provide sufficient background on the scope and
use of contracts for silence. Other uses are, of course, possible. For instance, contracts for
silence can be incorporated into agreements protecting the reputation of celebrities in
prenuptial agreements or protecting secret sources in journalism. See generally Garfield,
supra note 2, at 272 (explaining how such agreements can “protect privacy and
reputational interests”); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)
(dealing with a journalist’s source for inside political information who insisted upon
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considered win–win solutions for the parties involved.47
To be valid contracts, these agreements have to meet certain threshold
requirements––for instance, the agreements must constitute bargained-for
exchanges48 between at least two parties, supported by consideration.49 Welllawyered parties likely will not have trouble satisfying this contract formation
requirement or showing that the agreement resulted from a valid offer and
acceptance of the contract terms.50 While courts may sometimes invalidate
contracts between private parties for fear that a reasonable person would not
have intended the agreement to have legal force, such a ruling is harder to
imagine in the context of an agreement where one party is a state actor.51 Who
would imagine a contract with a government actor not to be binding, after
all? Indefiniteness of contract terms might provide another route for courts to
invalidate a contract for silence, though such an approach might require
creative decision-making on the part of judges.52
A substantive doctrine of contract law that may provide some
assistance here is unconscionability.53 “Unconscionability has generally
been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.”54 As a doctrine, unconscionability is perhaps
most relevant to adhesion contracts, i.e., “form contract[s] provided by a
confidentiality protections enshrined in contract); Huggins v. Povich, No. 131164/94,
1996 WL 515498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 19 1996) (addressing litigation concerns related
to such a celebrity postnuptial agreement).
47
Cf. Garfield, supra note 2, at 266 (describing why this system is untenable in certain situations
where public access to that information is critically important for one reason or another).
48
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
49
See generally id. §§ 71–94 (explaining the contractual requirement of consideration).
50
“Problems of contract formation are more common when contracts [for] silence are created
informally, particularly if they are oral.” Garfield, supra note 2, at 277.
51
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 48, § 21 cmt. c (“In some
situations the normal understanding is that no legal obligation arises . . . .”).
52
I say this because the sophisticated parties drafting contracts for silence are probably
unlikely to leave the meaning of key contract terms ambiguous, which would force
courts to construe such terms extremely narrowly and make the task of invalidating
the contract more difficult. However, courts would find support for this task in the
Restatement—which urges courts to construe contract terms in the light most favorable
to the public interest. See id. § 207 (“In choosing among reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement[,] . . . a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred.”).
53
Garfield describes one additional approach which I do not explore here: the construction
of § 557 of the First Restatement of Contracts, which he contends could rehabilitate the
notion “that parties should not use contracts to suppress information of public interest.”
Garfield, supra note 2, at 287. Since § 557 has only been referenced twice in judicial
decisions since 1932, I see it as unlikely to offer meaningful support. Id. at 288.
54
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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party with significantly greater bargaining power” than another.55 Yet,
unconscionability may not be as suited doctrinally to policing contracts
for silence since it focuses exclusively on the parties to the agreement and
not on the costs borne by third-parties. Since contracts for silence are most
problematic when they chill speech that might otherwise invigorate public
debate, unconscionability doesn’t feel like the right doctrinal hook for this
argument: applying it to the facts of a conventional contracts for silence
case would involve fitting a square peg into a round hole, so to speak.
A more appropriate doctrinal hook for this argument is the public policy
doctrine, which operates as a defense to the enforcement of contracts rather than
as an ex ante bar on contracting. The doctrine boils down to the truism that,
“[w]hile freedom of contract might exist, there is no freedom to use contracts to
undermine important societal values.”56 A public policy defense is available to
parties in litigation when “the interest in [a term’s] enforcement is clearly
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of
such terms.”57 Courts routinely look to duly enacted legislation as manifestations
of a jurisdiction’s public policy judgments, though most of the time, as with
contracts for silence implicating free speech values, there is no legislation on
point.58 While this balancing test for enforcing a public policy test seems intuitive,
it in fact “masks the difficulties that courts encounter in trying to apply it.”59 And
balancing test aside, the bar remains quite high.60
A. Public Policy as a Defense to Enforcement
Arguing for a public policy defense against enforcing for silence
poses unique challenges and opportunities. Unfortunately, studying the
impact of contracts for silence on the parties involved is made more difficult
by the fact that most are never the subject of litigation or, if they are, involve
sealed settlement agreements. On one hand, the strongest data-driven
arguments for invoking the public policy defense to enforcement are likely
case- and fact-specific.61 On the other hand, contracts for silence by state
55

Garfield, supra note 2, at 285.
Id. at 294.
57
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 48, § 178.
58
Id. § 178, cmt. a.
59
Garfield, supra note 2, at 314.
60
For instance, in Pennsylvania, “[a] contract, to be against public policy, must have a tendency
to injure the public or to be against the public good, or must be inconsistent with good morals as
to the consideration or the thing to be done.” In re Book’s Estate, 147 A. 608, 609 (Pa. 1929).
61
A couple of hypothetical cases serve to illustrate this point. What about the cases of tort
plaintiffs who expose government wrongdoing, especially with regard to construction or
56
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actors implicate hotly contested questions of whether and how parties should
be allowed to settle62 and whether, at an abstract level, “silence [is] something
that a party should be able to trade lawfully in a contract exchange . . . .”63
That the rights protected by the First Amendment “are arguably so
fundamental to the functioning of a democratic society” is also a strong
argument in favor of such a public policy defense.64 Plus, the fact that a wellfunctioning array of existing statutes controls the flow of information related
to national security suggests that contracts for silence may be overkill––or at
the very least created with motives other than safeguarding military
interests.65 In the following Sections, I sketch potential avenues for motivated
parties to explore when launching their own challenges to contracts for
silence, grounded in the public policy doctrine.66
B. Public Policy & Case Law
The public policy interests embodied in the landmark New York Times
v. Sullivan case lend some context to this worry that silencing––or chilling—
criticism of public officials undermines the purpose of the First Amendment’s
Free Speech Clause. Indeed, the Court relied on first principles in that 1964
case to hold that public officials could not bring libel suits against private

other services where the hazard could harm others (i.e. faulty bridge work)? And what about
patterns of sexual harassment by public employees directed at members of the public and
concealed by contracts for silence?
62
Compare Fiss, supra note 25, at 1076, and Luban, supra note 25, at 2621, with Miller,
supra note 25, at 464.
63
Garfield, supra note 2, at 294.
64
G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 516 (1993).
65
For instance, The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552 (2018); Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2 §1 (2018); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. §552b(b)
(2018); Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §2201–2207 (2018); and the Federal Records Act,
44 U.S.C. §3101–3107 (2018). In addition, for an example of how the Obama Administration
envisioned government transparency functioning, see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg.
13526 (Dec. 29, 2009) (establishing a framework for the governance of sensitive government
information––including declassification––on the grounds that, “[o]ur democratic principles
require that the American people be informed of the activities of their Government”).
66
Accord Garfield, supra note 2, at 266 (recommending that “courts deny enforcement to
[contracts of silence] when the public interest in access to the suppressed information
outweighs any legitimate interest in contract enforcement”). For another thoughtful analysis
of the public policy doctrine in the context of contracts for silence, see generally David A.
Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165 (2019)
(arguing that individuals who sign non-disclosure agreements following incidents of
sexual misconduct should be able to invoke a public policy defense to the enforcement of
those agreements against them in court).
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citizen critics of their official conduct absent a showing of actual malice.67
For the Sullivan Court, the most important function of the First Amendment
is to preserve the ability of private citizens to engage in open dialogue about
issues of public concern, even when that dialogue includes unwelcome (or
even unfriendly) critiques of public servants.68 While acknowledging the
trade-offs inherent in such a permissive system, the Court accepted the
wisdom of the Founders in creating strong free speech protections, writing,
“The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, ‘presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will
be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.’”69 Against this backdrop, the
abiding focus of the Sullivan Court was that the law could be construed to
silence citizen speech that was necessary for a robust, full debate on the issues
the advertisement at issue explored.70 This insight is particularly relevant to
the question of contemporary contracts for silence.
Constitutional law and politics scholar Mark Graber concurs. He takes
the approach that “the public policy exception in contract law” for these
situations “only makes sense in light of the public policy expressed by the
First Amendment or the Constitution.”71 Otherwise, “in a dictatorship that
recognized contract law, the ruling figures would have a right to buy up
critical or damaging speech.”72 Graber also makes the point that, for the
holding in Sullivan to mean anything, contracts for silence with public
officials must be unenforceable: “If the Constitution prohibits state tort laws
from sanctioning negligently false statements about public officials or
67

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
See, e.g., id. at 269 (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by
lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle
of our constitutional system.” (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931))).
69
Id. at 270 (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
70
For more, review the Court’s discussion of Justice Brandeis’s famous concurrence in Whitney
v. California: “Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, [“those who
won our independence”] eschewed silence coerced by law––the argument of force in its worst
form.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
71
Mark Graber, Stormy Daniels and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, BALKINIZATION (Mar.
17, 2018), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/03/stormy-daniels-and-new-york-times-cov.html [https://perma.cc/6WXE-C3QN]; cf. Jack M. Balkin, Stormy Daniels and Cambridge
Analytica, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 18, 2018), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/03/stormydaniels-and-cambridge-analytica.html [https://perma.cc/U2T9-3RYM] (explaining that
Stormy Daniels’s “best argument sounds in contract law,” not in First Amendment law under
the void for public policy doctrine espoused by Graber). Balkin’s response is not particularly
germane to this paper, however, since he spends most of his time thinking about the ability
of private actors like Facebook to enforce nondisclosure agreements.
72
Graber, supra note 71.
68
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candidates for public office [as it did in Sullivan], then the same First
Amendment plainly prohibits state contract law from sanctioning true
statements about public officials and candidates for public office.”73 By that
logic, we should not allow public officials (and candidates for elected office)
to contract around the limits Sullivan places on state actors’ abilities to enforce
state libel law against private citizens.74
C. Public Policy & Administrative Adjudications
As of yet, contracts for silence are an under-litigated topic in federal
courts. Determinations by administrative law judges are, however, filling the
gap. In the absence of legislative action, agencies are developing their own
record, which would support a court in holding such an agreement
unenforceable on public policy grounds. One such adjudication is Aurore C.
v. McDonald. In that matter, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) scrutinized a settlement agreement reached between
the Department of Veterans Affairs and a former nurse in a Seattle,
Washington care facility.75 First, the EEOC invalidated on public policy
grounds a provision stipulating that the complainant “[w]aive[d] future and
unknown disputes in any forum,” reasoning that “[i]t is axiomatic that parties
can only resolve actual existing disputes.”76 Second, the EEOC eyed the
agreement’s particularly broad nondisparagement provision, which read: “It
should be understood that Complainant shall be prohibited from making any
complaints or negative comments to any member of Congress or their staff,
or any newspapers or media . . . or any other public forums, about the facts
of this Settlement Agreement or the facts or conditions that led up to this
Settlement Agreement.”77 The EEOC held this provision void as “an
unlawful, overly restrictive confidentiality limitation” that infringed upon
“her First Amendment rights.”78 The Commission severed these two
provisions and let the remainder of the agreement stand.79 Aurore suggests
that at least in some corners, the public’s interest in transparency may
outweigh an individual party’s interest in silencing inconvenient speech.

73

Id.
See id. (“Public officials and candidates for office should no more be able to suppress criticism
of their behavior through nondisclosure agreements than they are through libel laws.”).
75
EEOC Decision No. 0120150961, 2016 WL 1622532 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 14, 2016).
76
Id. at *4–5.
77
Id. at *2.
78
Id. at *5.
79
Id.
74
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D. Some Objections
While this argument against the enforcement of contracts for silence
is doctrinally sound, courts may not find it feasible to implement. For one,
advocating for the use of public policy defenses to contract enforcement
necessarily requires drawing a line in the sand and articulating not only the
public costs of enforcing such an agreement, but also the countervailing
values which favor voiding it. Any legal doctrine requiring such absolutist
reasoning invites suggestions that the advocate overstates his case.80 While
there are significant consequences to the secrecy interests served by contracts
for silence,81 such critiques are impossible to escape––indeed, they are a
feature, not a bug, of this area of law.
Another objection to this approach rests on the alleged ephemeral
nature of public policy defenses. By this account, public policy as a doctrine
has no limiting principle, inviting abuse.82 These worries may be overstated,
though. As David Hoffman and I explained elsewhere, “[p]ublic policy . . . is
merely a contractual shield, not a sword, and can only be used by those
internal to the contractual relationship.”83 Other limits further cabin the reach
of public policy defenses. As opposed to a legislative solution, public policy
defenses “are adopted by common law courts in a step-wide, slow, and
accretive manner.”84 The benefits of this approach are clear: “If one court
goes too far[,] . . . the next court considering such an agreement can choose
again.”85 Plus, the doctrine has a media-friendly posture; it’s relatively easily
understood and sends a clear message to the public about the “social meaning
of [these] legal agreements.”86
It is worth adding that advancing this contract law argument against
the enforceability of contracts for silence would serve yet one additional
80
See 6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §1375 (1962) (“The loudest
and most confident assertions as to what makes for the general welfare and happiness of
mankind are made by the demagogue and the ignoramus.”).
81
See, e.g., Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 66, at 198 (2019) (“[S]ecrecy creates a
unique set of problems when it is attached to the settlement of legal rights that have
collective attributes.”).
82
The epitome of this critique is an oft-cited line from a British case, “[Public policy] is a
very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.”
Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303.
83
Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 66, at 200.
84
Id. at 201–02.
85
Id. at 202.
86
Id. at 205. For more on the expressive significance of law, generally, and contract law,
specifically, see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2025 (1996) (exploring the messages communicated by law and the relation of law to
shifting social mores).
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interest: that of rehabilitating contract law and letting it speak on matters of
social, political, and economic importance.87 At the same time, making only
this contract law argument would foreclose the First Amendment approach
to contracts for silence, an approach which might resonate at a different and
deeper level with everyday Americans.88
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT LAW ARGUMENT
The First Amendment dimensions of contracts for silence stem from
an underlying belief—a civic commitment—that state-sponsored secrecy
corrupts democratic governments.89 In the context of contracts for silence,
where parties enter into binding agreements with others to relinquish their
right to uninhibited speech, this civic commitment is potentially threatened.
In this Part, I contemplate two genres of legal claims against President Trump
stemming from his use of contracts for silence: (1) government employees
facing NDA enforcement actions for disclosing nonclassified information; as
well as (2) former campaign staff facing enforcement actions initiated by
current public officials for alleged violations of NDAs that pre-dated their
government service. In doing so, I locate government contracts for silence
within First Amendment jurisprudence concerning speech protections available
to government employees. I further contend that current or former employees
of the President are more likely to successfully defend against an enforcement
action if their claims fall into the first category rather than the second.
A. Defenses Available to Current or Former Administration Employees
In this Section, I explore several lines of Supreme Court cases
supporting public employees’ Free Speech rights. While the Court has
chipped away at the unrestrained right of government employees to speak on
87

Cf. supra Part I (explaining that contemporary contract law deals far more with arbitration
provisions and standard-form agreements than these sort of loftier ideals). For more on how
contracts for silence “hush” contract law itself, see Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 66,
at 220.
88
Garfield focused his analyses on contract law arguments to the detriment of his First
Amendment analysis. Maybe this consideration failed to sway him. See, e.g., Garfield, supra note
2, at 267 (identifying the state action and waiver doctrines as important but unclear considerations
for those seeking to defend against enforcement actions for contracts for silence).
89
JEREMY BENTHAM, An Essay in Political Tactics, or Inquiries Concerning the Discipline
and Mode of Proceeding Proper to Be Observed in Political Assemblies: Principally Applied
to the Practice of the British Parliament, and to the Constitution and Situation of the
National Assembly of France, in 2 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 298, 315 (John Bowring
ed., 1838–43) (“Secresy is an instrument of conspiracy; it ought not, therefore, to be the
system of a regular government.”).
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matters of public importance over the years, this doctrine remains a reliable
way for employees, in their personal capacities, to engage in civic discussions.
In the context of contracts for silence, these cases stand for the proposition that
restrictions on the speech of government employees must bear some relation to
the positions they occupy; under this doctrine, firing from the hip and silencing
all government employee speech must be illegal.
The seminal case in this area of law is Pickering. There, the Court
came to the defense of an Illinois teacher, fired for publishing a newspaper
opinion piece opposing a proposed tax increase that his employer, the local
Board of Education, supported.90 The Board justified its decision to terminate
the teacher by characterizing his piece as “detrimental to the efficient
operation and administration of the schools of the district.”91 The Court saw
things differently, emphasizing that the tax increase was “a matter of
legitimate public concern” and that “[o]n such a question free and open
debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate.”92 Especially
because teachers are “most likely to have informed and definite opinions
as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should be spent,”
the Court held that their voices were particularly valuable to the public
debate and that they should be permitted to engage in that debate without
“fear of retaliatory dismissal.”93
The Court then took the opportunity presented by Pickering’s fact
pattern to pronounce upon broader First Amendment values. First, the
Court re-emphasized “[t]he public interest in having free and unhindered
debate on matters of public importance” as “the core value of the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”94 Second, the Court explained
that, under recent case law, if the opinion piece in question was penned
by a private citizen who wasn’t employed by the School District, the
Board would have no “legal right to sue” the author, absent a showing
that the statements ran afoul of the standard set out in New York Times v.
Sullivan.95 Since the teacher had no close working relationship with the

90

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
Id.
92
Id. at 571–72.
93
Id. at 572.
94
Id. at 573.
95
The standard set out in New York Times v. Sullivan allowed public officials to seek
recovery from members of the general public who allegedly defamed them only when the
officials can put on proof that the speech contained “statements . . . shown to have been made
either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.” Id.
91
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Board and didn’t handle tax matters on a day-to-day basis,96 the Court
read his opinion piece as an attempt to speak as a member of the general
public on a critical issue, which entitled him to free speech rights.97
Pickering has come to stand for the proposition that public employees do
have a constitutional right to speak on matters of public concern without
fear of retaliation, so long as they don’t make knowingly or recklessly
false statements.98
Fifteen years later, in Connick v. Myers, the Court revisited the
question of how far public employees’ First Amendment rights extend when
speaking on matters of public concern. Connick dealt with the termination of a
New Orleans Assistant District Attorney who refused a transfer to another
section of the District Attorney’s Office and who, in an alleged act of “miniinsurrection,”99 circulated a workplace questionnaire to colleagues.100 In that
case, the Court restated the holding of Pickering and emphasized the importance
of “seek[ing] a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees.”101 But unlike the Pickering Court, the majority in Connick
determined this balancing test benefitted the District Attorney’s Office and not
petitioner.102 Core to this determination was the Court’s judgment that the
staffing conditions addressed via petitioner’s questionnaire did not
constitute “a matter of public concern.”103 For that reason, the local
government deserved “wide latitude in managing their offices, without
96

Earlier in the opinion, the Court observed that the teacher’s “employment relationships
with the Board and, to a somewhat lesser extent, with the superintendent are not the kind of
close working relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty
and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning.” Id. at 570. The Court alluded to
that observation when concluding on the extent of petitioner’s First Amendment rights,
writing that in Pickering, “the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially
involved in the subject matter of the public communication,” suggesting the rule they laid
out ought not be read as categorical. Id. at 574.
97
Id. at 574.
98
Id. at 574–75.
99
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983).
100
Id. at 140-41. The questionnaire sought to gauge employees’ thoughts on a variety of
subjects, including the “office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to
work in political campaigns.” Id.
101
Id. at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102
Id.
103
To be fair, the Court conceded that one of petitioner’s questions did seem to touch on a
matter of public concern (the question concerning political campaigns) but that when
evaluated holistically, that question did not outweigh the questions which failed to touch
on public concerns. Id. at 146–47.
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intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment.”104 Connick can therefore be read as distinguishing Pickering—
especially when a public employee speaks on internal employment
matters—and triggering a balancing test in all other instances where a
public interest is potentially implicated.105
It took over twenty years for the Court to revisit and amend the
Connick approach. In a 2006 case, Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court
substantially cabined the First Amendment rights of public employees as
recognized in Connick and Pickering, holding that, “when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties,” they “are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes” and no First Amendment rights are
implicated.106 Aware that some would accuse it of collapsing the Pickering
framework in on itself, the Court countered by suggesting (perhaps
implausibly) that public employees did not lose rights because of the holding
in Garcetti.107 From the majority’s perspective, “[r]efusing to recognize First
Amendment claims based on government employees’ work product does not
prevent them from participating in public debate.”108 By this logic, while
public employees can, of course, engage in public debate as citizens, that does
not mean they can “perform their jobs however they see fit.”109 After
Garcetti, therefore, only public employees making statements outside of their
official duties that touch on matters of public concern are entitled to the
judicial balancing test under Pickering and its progeny.110
The Court clarified the first prong of Garcetti’s two-step inquiry in a
2014 related case, Lane v. Franks.111 There, a public employee, Lane, alleged
that his former employer retaliated against him for offering testimony in a
coworker’s public corruption trial by firing him in violation of his First
Amendment rights.112 The Court was asked to consider “whether the First
Amendment protects a public employee who provides truthful sworn testimony,
compelled by subpoena, outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities.”113
At trial, the district court relied on Garcetti to hold that, since “Lane had learned
of the information that he testified about while working [for the state],” his
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speech fell within his “official job duties” and was not subject to First
Amendment protection.114
In a uniquely straightforward opinion, the Supreme Court rejected
that analysis, holding that Lane’s speech was not only protected by the First
Amendment, but also that it was a “quintessential example” of the type of
speech the Founders envisioned protecting under the Free Speech Clause.115
To Justice Sotomayor, it mattered that Lane divulged the information in a
judicial proceeding. She elaborated, writing, “Anyone who testifies in court
bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.”116
Relying on this justification, the Court clarified the Garcetti test, adding that
the crucial question in such analyses “is whether the speech at issue is itself
ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely
concerns those duties.”117 Lane therefore provides a helpful coda to Garcetti
both by developing the concept of a “matter of public concern” and by
insisting that the context of speech is relevant to any judicial inquiry under
the First Amendment.
1. Protections for Public Employee Speech on Matters of
Public Concern
Determining whether or not public employee speech falls “within the
protected category of citizen commentary on matters of public concern”
remains a difficult inquiry, however. Lower court opinions, as well as
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, help clarify the contours of this
category but stop short of providing bright-line rules. For the purpose of my
analysis, these opinions include cases dealing with two aspects of
government speech: its audience and its content.
Recent case law has placed some significance on the right of third
parties to hear what public employees have to say. For instance, in Harman
v. City of New York, the Second Circuit held that a city agency could not
require its employees to seek permission before speaking to the press.118 The
court clarified that the City would have needed to demonstrate “actual harm
justifying such a broad restriction on the ability of employees to comment on
the workings of the city agencies” for the regulation to pass muster.119 The
regulation was struck down, because the City failed to make such a showing
114

Id. at 234–35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 238.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 240.
118
Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111 (1998).
119
Id. at 115.
115

Vol. 4:1]

President Trump’s Contracts for Silence

145

and because restraining public employees’ speech “also imposes a significant
burden on the public’s right to read and hear what the employees would have
otherwise written and said”.120 Harman was arguably a narrow ruling,
however; it turned on the ability of television news viewers to hear what a
government employee had to say. As the Seventh Circuit clarified in
Wernsing v. Thompson, the calculus changes, then, when the matters
concerned are entirely internal to a government workplace.121
The content of the speech is also critical, particularly when the topic
of the employee’s speech is related, even indirectly, to the employee’s
professional obligations. For instance, in Lane, Justice Sotomayor observed
that the plaintiff’s testimony on the topic of “corruption in a public program
and misuse of state funds” was “obviously” a matter of public concern and
that the context of the speech (sworn judicial testimony) bolstered that
conclusion.122 The Supreme Court has since clarified, however, that the
threshold for making meaningful citizen commentary on matters of public
concern is not as low a bar as potentially suggested by Justice Sotomayor.
For instance, making statements while clothed (either literally in a
government uniform, or metaphorically) in the indicia of government
affiliation isn’t enough to trigger protection under the First Amendment.123
Lower courts have also stepped into the gap and attempted to shore
up the meaning of “public concern,” sometimes protecting the employee and
sometimes siding with her employer. For instance, the Ninth Circuit, has held
as a general principle that “the public’s interest in learning about illegal
conduct by public officials and other matters at the core of First Amendment
protection outweighs a state employer’s interest in avoiding a mere potential
disturbance to the workplace.”124 The Ninth Circuit has also ruled that a police
regulation preventing officers from discussing any and all elements of a K9
120
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program with the public violated an officer’s First Amendment rights because
it was too broad and not narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary disturbance to
the force.125
Taken together, these data points suggest that a lawsuit challenging
the Trump Administration’s contracts for silence with current White House
employees would stand a good chance of success. For one, the NDAs leaked
from the White House are extremely broad, covering nearly every utterance
made by current and former employees. The agreements do not appear to
discriminate between potential hearers or between different types of
information (classified v. nonclassified; sensitive v. mundane). Employees
hushed by the Administration’s contracts for silence likely have the best
chance of defending enforcement actions if they can paint their public speech
(or written exposés) as commenting on potential corruption within the
executive branch. As both Lane and Robinson make clear, public debate over,
and scrutiny of, government officials’ behavior––their stewardship of the
collective trust––is of critical public importance. Yet even if public
corruption were not raised directly in the speech at issue, litigants would have
strong arguments that the Trump NDAs in their current form impermissibly
chill citizen speech.
2. Permissible Restrictions on Public Employee Speech Concerning
National Security
While “the Government may not generally restrict individuals from
disclosing information that lawfully comes into their hands in the absence of
a ‘state interest of the highest order,’”126 it is also the case that “[g]overnment
officials in sensitive confidential positions may have special duties of
nondisclosure.”127 In the context of this Comment, these special duties
complicate the analysis. After all, if governments are able to bind public officials
to silence––and those employees are the subject of many, if not most,
contracts for silence––does not that render moot much of this argument? In
fact, while a handful of government employees are subject to certain speech
limitations when privy to information relevant to national security, they
generally constitute a small minority of public officials. What’s more, the record
contains no apparent examples of government employees in non-intelligence or
national security offices being held to such exacting silence standards. Charting
the evolution of caselaw attempting to make sense of these dynamics may help
clarify the rights of public officials to challenge contracts for silence.
125
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The first such case is Snepp v. United States, where the Court held
that government employees can be contractually barred from publishing not
only classified but also nonclassified information without prepublication
review.128 In that case, the government sought and was granted enforcement
of a nondisclosure agreement against Snepp, a former CIA intelligence
officer, who “published a book about certain [agency] activities in South
Vietnam” without first submitting it for prepublication review.129 In its
opinion, the Court minimized the importance of the distinction between
classified and nonclassified information, instead recognizing the “vital
national interests” jeopardized when individuals fail to follow
prepublication review protocols, which can “impai[r] the CIA’s ability to
perform its statutory duties.”130 Since the Court was unwilling to challenge
the CIA’s determination that even nonclassified information could be
potentially damaging to the government’s security interests, it resolved the
matter by pointing to Snepp’s breach of his trust relationship with the CIA
and directed the proceeds of his book into government coffers.131
But it does not stop there. A year after Snepp, the Court affirmed its
deference to the Executive when confronted with a case where covert
intelligence interests butted up against free speech rights.132 In Haig v.
Agee, the Court held the Secretary of State can lawfully revoke the passport
of a U.S. citizen when that citizen’s speech imperils national security
interests.133 Haig dealt with a disaffected CIA officer’s “campaign to
expose CIA officers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive
them out of the countries where they are operating.”134 The Secretary of
State, provided with information about the officer’s activities, revoked his
passport, justifying the revocation by pointing to the fact that his activities
“[were] causing or [were] likely to cause serious damage to the national
128

Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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security or the foreign policy of the United States.”135 The revocation also
contained a notice advising the passport holder of his right to a post-revocation
hearing.136 The Court explained that, while the statute authorizing the
government to issue passports did not explicitly contain provisions authorizing
passport revocation, a combination of the “consistent administrative
construction of that statute” to permit revocations and the uniquely
compelling foreign policy and national interests at stake justified deference
to the Secretary of State.137 The Court also held that the Department of
State’s notice of passport revocation and offer of a post-revocation hearing
met the constitutional requirements of the Due Process Clause.138
Haig was not without its critics. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice
Marshall joined, dissented forcefully, worried that Haig’s First
Amendment implications were deleterious to individual liberties.139 The
dissenters took issue with the majority’s reasoning that Defendant’s
critiques of the CIA weren’t entitled to constitutional protections.140 While
they conceded that the facts of Haig were quite hard to overcome, Justices
Brennan and Marshall nonetheless held firm in their belief that the content
of the defendant’s speech was protected, however “unpopular” it might
have been.141 While they pointed to administrative law rationales for why
the Secretary of State might have overstepped his authority,142 they argued
more persuasively that the precedent set by the Haig majority applied “not
only to Philip Agee, whose activities could be perceived as harming the
national security, but also to other citizens who may merely disagree with
Government foreign policy and express their views.”143
At first glance, it’s unlikely that members of the Trump
Administration will successfully prevent current or former employees from
disclosing nonclassified information so long as it does not trip the “sensitive
information” wire in Snepp. There will certainly be edge cases where
135
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information is plausibly related to national security and also plausibly
mundane. Nevertheless, courts will not permit the President to deem all
information shared with his employees as subject to national security secrecy
provisions––especially since doing so might also come with efficiency losses
as more and more information is subject to some form of classification. What
Snepp and its progeny tell us, therefore, is that public employees seeking to avoid
enforcement actions by the Trump White House would be well-advised to refrain
from disseminating information closely related to the military, intelligence
gathering, or national security, as it would substantially weaken their defense.
Nonetheless, the Trump Administration does appear willing to contest
the dissemination of supposedly unclassified information in violation of
NDAs, as evidenced by legal action taken in Fall 2019. In November, for
instance, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Division sought to halt
publication of a book by an anonymous senior executive branch official144
who previously drew President Trump’s ire for publishing an opinion piece
in The New York Times.145 The DOJ asserted that, by publishing the book, the
author “may violate [the] official’s legal obligations under one or more
[NDAs].”146 The publishing house, Hachette, promptly refused to halt
publication, defending their author and noting, “Hachette is not party to any
nondisclosure agreements with the U.S. government that would require any
prepublication review of this book, and Hachette routinely relies on its
authors to comply with any contractual obligations they may have.”147
Importantly, DOJ lawyers did not file suit against Hachette at the time––nor
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have they as this Comment goes to print.148 Whether the decision to refrain
from doing so reflects an awareness of the potentially dubious strength of the
Department’s legal claims remains to be seen. What is clear is that, as NDAs
and nondisparagement agreements continue to make news,149 the stakes of
these legal dramas become higher and higher.
3. An Objection––When Parties Waive Their Constitutional Rights
The Trump Administration nevertheless has strong counterarguments
to raise against any current or former employee seeking to expose
information the President would prefer to remain secret. In this Subsection, I
will focus my attention on the strongest such argument: that the employees
in question signed away their First Amendment rights and that doing so was
entirely lawful. Current and former employees have reason to pause and
carefully consider the likelihood of the Administration prevailing on this
claim. After all, while waiver sounds in constitutional law, it draws its
inspiration from contract law principles––namely, that courts ought to trust
parties’ stated intentions as memorialized in duly enacted written agreements.
That the legal landscape surrounding the waiver of constitutional rights,
specifically First Amendment rights, is difficult to parse only increases the
likelihood that the Administration could persuade courts to adopt this easily
applicable contract law approach. In this Subsection, I will chart the benefits
and drawbacks of permitting individuals to waive their constitutional rights and
explain how plaintiffs might respond to the arguments contemplated above.
148
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On its face, waiving constitutional rights is not always problematic. On
the one hand, courts must allow parties to waive constitutional rights to ensure
the continued functioning of our judicial system, particularly in criminal
cases.150 “Constitutional rights are waived every day. People incriminate
themselves, surrender their rights to counsel, waive a bundle of rights as part of
plea bargains, and sign contracts surrendering a right to trial through arbitration
or confession of judgment clauses.”151 These efficiency gains are critically
important, especially against the backdrop of a federal judiciary struggling under
the burden of increasing filings. Plus, they save parties money: “[i]n terms of
monetary costs, waivers allow people to reach informal agreements that avoid
the expense of asserting their rights.”152 Lastly, “waivers frequently save time”
by allowing parties to quickly resolve their disputes153
On the other hand, waivers can be dangerous. “Waivers can be
dangerous for precisely the same reason that they can be valuable: they
constitute alternatives to the protections provided by the plenary assertion of
one’s rights.”154 Allowing individuals to “waive” their rights only makes
sense when they do so consciously155––and even then, certain rights are
beyond the scope of the doctrine (e.g., the right to waive one’s Thirteenth
Amendment rights).156 Indeed, there is a collective sense that courts should
more closely police the waiver of the core rights vested in each of us.157 But
even there, courts can get it wrong; by focusing their waiver analyses on the
individual parties to an agreement—devoid of a broader context—they may
fail to see the whole field, potentially permitting waiver in exactly those
instances where individuals stand to lose the most.158 Plus, waiver of First
150
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Amendment rights is arguably distinguishable from waiver of constitutional
rights in criminal proceedings. When you waive your right to a jury, you have
a clear sense of what you’re giving up; when you waive future rights of free
expression, you don’t yet know what opportunities you are trading away. This
begs the question: is the waiver of constitutional rights appropriate in the
context of President Trump’s contracts for silence?
At first blush, it would seem plaintiffs have little leeway due to the
enforcement-friendly waiver, especially since the Court has never had occasion to
announce a legal standard for when individuals can waive their First Amendment
rights.159 In the absence of controlling precedent, circuit courts have generally
mapped traditional waiver of constitutional rights standards onto the First
Amendment.160 The Ninth Circuit, for instance, “has established that contracts [for
silence] can evidence knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver because parties
have the ability to exchange rights in the bargaining process.”161 On the margins,
courts might also consider mitigating factors like whether the agreement was
“reached through fraud, duress, or mutual mistake.”162 They may also consider the
relative strength of the parties involved, especially their financial resources.163 The
fact remains, however, that arguing about these factors is unlikely to vindicate
the rights of the plaintiffs my Comment contemplates.
But much as the public policy doctrine sets the outer limits of the
freedom of contract, the doctrine of alienability polices the appropriate use
of constitutional waivers. While there are reasons to accept individuals’
conscious decisions to waive constitutional rights in certain instances, we
might also worry about the aggregate effect of such decisions over time,
particularly in the context of contracts for silence.164 For instance, arguably
there are certain rights which are not an individual’s to waive. This is how
we reach alienability. A right is waivable, or alienable, when “the power not
159
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to exercise the right [is] transferable to another party in exchange for the
proffered benefit.”165 A right would be inalienable, however, when it was not
possible for an individual to transfer their interest. The best argument in
defense of the plaintiffs I contemplate would therefore be to emphasize the
inalienability of their speech rights. They might argue, for instance, that
allowing individuals to sell off their ability to speak on matters of public
concern undermines our core democratic values––and that even if individuals
can sign away their free speech rights to other private parties, purchasing
citizen speech should always be off limits to the State.166
B. Defenses Available to Former Private Sector Employees of the President
The argument that the President, by virtue of his current public office,
should be restrained from enforcing contracts for silence against previous
private-sector or campaign employees is harder to make out—no matter how
you cut it.167 On one hand, the above principles of democratic accountability
counsel that the State should not be permitted to chill citizen speech on
matters of public concern, especially when that information is not necessary
to safeguard national security. On the other hand, these individuals willingly
limited their free speech rights via contract before they knew the other party
to their agreement would become President of the United States. In this
Section, I explore the unique policy arguments for and against blocking the
President’s enforcement actions against such employees, while attempting to
locate the strongest possible defenses available to such plaintiffs who square
off against the President.
The best arguments in favor of forbidding enforcement actions by the
President against former private-sector employees are grounded in democratic
theory and in novel attempts to reconceptualize First Amendment
165
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jurisprudence. Scholarship by democratic theorists supports the proposition
that secrecy undermines trust, transparency, and faith in government––
particularly when that secrecy is engaged in conspiratorially and with the
express purpose of hiding wrongdoing from view.168 Commitments like these
to government accountability are no longer outliers; international norms now
reflect the idea that “[o]penness and transparency are key ingredients to build
accountability and trust, which are necessary for the functioning of democracies
and market economies.”169 So long as Americans tolerate state actors using
contracts for silence to manipulate the scope of public debate––and oftentimes
to chill the speech of the individuals best positioned to steer that debate––we
are complicit in the corruption of those norms.
By inhibiting the free flow of information, government-enforced
secrecy places constraints on “speech concerning public affairs,” which is
itself “more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”170
Indeed, “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each
person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence.”171 Self-actualization through
speech, debate, and engagement with the government is core to the American
ideal and sustains our democratic project; it ensures “the unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.”172 In short, plaintiffs could potentially contend that
contracts for silence undermine the Framers’ vision for free and open debate
by making it harder or impossible for them to hold their former employer,
now-President Trump, accountable.173
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An alternative approach for these plaintiffs would be to explain that
the free exchange of ideas facilitated by the First Amendment “furthers
intrinsic and instrumental values for speakers and listeners,” with a distinct
emphasis on the latter.174 A recent champion of this position is Burt
Neuborne, former Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union. He
has publicly advocated for such a position by arguing that courts ought to
shift the focus of First Amendment scholarship away from the unquestioned
primacy of the “speaker” and towards a “hearer”-centric model, especially in
the context of contracts for silence.175 Neuborne’s thesis is that “asserting a
hearer’s ‘right to know’ as the counterweight to promises she hasn’t
consented to may be the only plausible route to attacking NDAs . . . under
federal law as violations of the First Amendment.”176 Since “[t]he Court has
recognized that respecting a hearer’s First Amendment interest in receiving
information can pry important information out of unwilling speakers”––
especially in the context of FOIA or consumer protection suits––adopting a
hearer-centered approach to First Amendment advocacy might allow the Court
to reach the sorts of edge cases like those contemplated in this section.177
Neuborne is not alone in this position. David Cole has similarly
argued for a hearer-centered approach to First Amendment jurisprudence,
writing, “[w]hen the government funds speech . . . First Amendment concerns
are not limited to potential coercion of the subsidized speaker.”178 Instead,
they “extend also, and perhaps more importantly, to the listener. From the
perspective of the audience, the danger lies not in the coercive effect of the
benefit on speaker, but in the indoctrinating effect of a monopolized
marketplace of ideas.”179 Applying Neuborne’s hypothesis to the genre of
lawsuit contemplated here would require plaintiffs to describe in great detail
the public’s interest in whatever information they wanted to reveal. To be
successful, such disclosure would likely need to add important evidence to
an ongoing public debate of the highest order.
Of course, an argument like Neuborne’s is not likely to suddenly carry
the day. Additional research and factfinding would be required for it to take
hold. In fact, recent caselaw suggests that the Court may be particularly
averse to blocking NDA enforcement actions when the individuals seeking
to disclose information only gained access to that information subsequent to
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signing away their right to disclose it; such circumstances create “a powerful
equitable basis . . . for enforcing the promise as a form of reliance,” as
compared to a situation where an individual had access to certain information,
signed an NDA, and then wanted to share that information so as to prevent
third-party harm.180 For these reasons, I find it hard to believe the courts
would endorse such a novel approach to the First Amendment––at least while
litigation stemming from Trump campaign malfeasance remains live.
CONCLUSION
NDAs and nondisparagement agreements are now common features of
our contracting landscape. Their increased use by state actors, however, presents
new challenges to safeguarding our core democratic values. In the absence of
legislative action,181 the task of controlling the spread of contracts for silence by
elected officials, like the President, falls to litigants. In this Article, I have
provided hypothetical plaintiffs a roadmap as they aim to hold accountable
elected officials who would use contracts for silence to chill the speech of those
they have sworn to serve.

180

See Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1991) (permitting recovery under a
promissory estoppel theory for a confidential source who, after having shared information
with a newspaper on the condition of anonymity, had his identity revealed in breach of
contract). Neuborne has suggested this distinction as “a basis for distinguishing Snepp and
Cowles Media from situations like Stormy Daniels’s NDA, where her possession of the
information she wishes to disseminate has nothing to do with her promise not to speak.”
Neuborne, supra note 3, at 433.
181
Cf. NDAs: New Laws to Crack Down on ‘Gagging’ Clauses, BBC (July 21, 2019), https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-49060456 [https://perma.cc/JH7R-WVK2] (describing legislative
proposals in the United Kingdom which would “ban NDAs that stop people disclosing
information to the police, doctors, or lawyers”).

